

“We Need the UN and this Council to Do Much More”: Activists from the MENA Region Engage the Security Council on Women, Peace and Security

Stephanie Chaban

To cite this article: Chaban, S. (2023). “We Need the UN and this Council to do Much More”: Activists from the MENA Region Engage the Security Council on Women, Peace and Security. *Al-Raida*, 47(1), 89-104.

© 2023 The Author(s)

Corresponding author: Stephanie Chaban

Author contact: amorars@yahoo.com

Article type: Article

Published online: 8 March 2023

Publisher: Arab Institute for Women

Publication support provided by: Escienta

Journal ISSN: 0259-9953

Copyright: This is an Open Access article, free of all copyright, and may be freely reproduced, distributed, transmitted, modified, built upon, or otherwise used by anyone for any lawful purpose. The work is made available under the Creative Commons Attribution (CC-BY) 4.0 license.

“We Need the UN and this Council to Do Much More”: Activists from the MENA Region Engage the Security Council on Women, Peace and Security

Stephanie Chaban

Abstract

To better understand the role played by women’s rights activists and civil society representatives who engage directly with the United Nations Security Council on the topic of Women, Peace and Security, this text presents insights and analysis from interviews with three human rights and women’s rights activists from the Middle East and North Africa region who have briefed the Security Council on conflicts in their respective countries, and the impact these conflicts have on the lives of women and girls. The discussion finds that while the Women, Peace and Security agenda is an important tool for addressing the gendered impact of conflict, the activists draw upon other international frameworks to affect change in their respective contexts. Furthermore, the interviews find that more must be done, beyond the Security Council and the formal Women, Peace and Security agenda, to ensure a holistic and lasting response to the gendered impact of conflict in the Middle East and North Africa region.

Keywords: Civil Society; Women, Peace and Security; Security Council; Palestine; Libya; Yemen

Introduction

The Women, Peace and Security (WPS) agenda has been part of the international landscape for more than two decades now. The agenda comprises 10 Security Council resolutions that promote four pillars of intervention: Prevention, Protection, Participation, and Relief and Recovery.¹ As such, it aims to serve as a framework for promoting a gender perspective in all aspects of peace and security, including women’s participation in conflict prevention and disarmament, protection during conflict and displacement, peacekeeping, transitional justice

mechanisms, and relief and recovery. In 2013, the United Nations Security Council resolution (UNSCR) 2122 was passed to augment the growing WPS agenda (at the time, it was the seventh resolution). Compared to a majority of the resolutions in the agenda that focused on the prevention of conflict-related sexual and gender-based violence, UNSCR 2122 focused attention on the participation and leadership of women's rights activists and women's civil society in conflict prevention and peace processes, including a provision that:

Requests the Secretary-General and his Special Envoys and Special Representatives to United Nations missions, as part of their regular briefings, to update the Council on progress in inviting women to participate, including through consultations with civil society, including women's organizations, in discussions pertinent to the prevention and resolution of conflict, the maintenance of peace and security and post-conflict peacebuilding. (article 2(c))

Two years later, this resolution was complemented by UNSCR 2242 (2015), which echoed the "intention to invite civil society, including women's organizations, to brief the Council in country-specific considerations and relevant thematic areas" (article 5(c)).

These resolutions have since been augmented by UNSCR 2467 (2019) and UNSCR 2493 (2019), which respectively call upon the Security Council and other relevant actors to organize interactive meetings with local women and women's organizations in the field, engage in regular briefings by women from civil society, support and promote civil society, including local, grassroots, and women-led organizations, and recognize the important role and contribution of women's organizations in the WPS agenda.

With the passage of these resolutions, the Security Council now regularly hosts open debates on various themes, including WPS and conflict-related sexual violence (CRSV).² One facilitator of civil society's engagement with the Security Council is the NGO Working Group on Women, Peace and Security (NGOWG), which was formed in 2000 "to bring the voices of women's rights defenders and local peacebuilders into the New York peace and security discussions [and] serve as a bridge between women's human rights defenders and peacebuilders working in conflict-affected situations and senior policymakers at UN Headquarters" (NGOWG, 2020). Since the passage of UNSCR 1325, the Security Council has regularly heard from women civil society leaders

during the annual debate on WPS and, since 2004, during the annual debate on CRSV (cook, 2016; UN Women, 2015).

Under these directives, by the agenda's 20th anniversary, over 138 representatives from women's civil society from 32 countries had delivered statements to the Security Council (NGOWG, 2020). This is notable given that prior to 2015, civil society representatives were not allowed to participate in country-specific discussions with the Security Council, and were only invited to thematic agenda items, Arria-formula meetings,³ and official side events, which are equally important venues for engagement (McMillan et al., 2020). The Global Study on the implementation of the WPS agenda, among others, states that civil society and women's organizations are critical sources of information, serving as both constituency and stakeholders (UN Women, 2015) and, yet, there continues to be an uncomfortable engagement with the Security Council, an entity commonly viewed as a site of militarized patriarchal power with a narrow view of security. Furthermore, allies of activists have expressed concern that Council members have occasionally aimed to exploit civil society participants, particularly capitalizing on their pain and suffering rather than seeking to benefit from their specialized knowledge and recommendations (cook & Allen, 2020).

To better understand the role played by women's rights activists and civil society representatives who engage directly with the United Nations Security Council on the topic of WPS, this text presents insights and analysis from interviews with three human rights and women's rights activists from the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) region who have briefed the Security Council on conflicts in their respective countries and the impact these conflicts have on the lives of women and girls. Interviews were conducted with Asma Khalifa, an activist and researcher from Libya who works on human rights, women's rights, and youth empowerment; she is the cofounder of the Tamazight Women Movement and cofounder of the Khalifa Ihler Institute. Rasha Jarhum, is a South Yemeni women's rights activist who is co-founder and Director of the Peace Track Initiative. As a gender and peace and security expert, her work focuses on supporting the inclusion of women in the Yemeni peace process. And finally, Randa Siniora is a Palestinian human rights and women's rights defender. Currently, she is the General Director of the Women's Center for Legal Aid and Counselling in Palestine.

Given that only three activists from the region were interviewed, this paper does not intend to make any sweeping claims about the impact of their (and, thus, MENA civil society's) engagement with the Security Council. Rather, the intention is to better understand how activists who are working in a region that stands out for its marked inequalities—particularly gender inequality—and face serious and multi-faceted security concerns, view their own interventions within the larger framework of WPS.

To provide context, this paper first examines some of the feminist critiques of the WPS agenda, both globally and regionally. This will create the basis for presenting some of the themes discussed during the interviews. The rest of the paper then provides some reflections from Asma Khalifa, Rasha Jarhum, and Randa Siniora on their direct engagement with the Security Council on the subject of WPS. The last section of the paper presents some recommendations the activists proposed for augmenting civil society's engagement with the Security Council.

Feminist Critiques of the Women, Peace and Security Agenda

The rhetoric of the WPS agenda has been absorbed into global normative discourses. However, several critiques have arisen concerning its evolution from an intersectional feminist framework that seeks to actively engage women during and after conflict to its more recent engagement with a liberal feminist perspective and governance feminism that overlooks the diversity of women's experiences and autonomy (Kaya, 2020; Otto, 2019). According to Chinkin (2022), "even provisions urging women's participation and representation are phrased instrumentally in that they are said to be important for the 'prevention and resolution of conflicts and in peace-building' rather than for women's advancement" (p. 20).

The agenda stresses the importance of women's equal, full, and active participation in peace and security. For many, however, the true fulfillment of the WPS agenda involves addressing the structural causes of women's inequality during and beyond conflict, aiming for global disarmament, ending armed conflict, and working toward a feminist peace (Kaya, 2020; Otto, 2010). This is because, rather than preventing conflict, the focus of the agenda is on making armed conflict "safer" for women (Kaya, 2020) and, in some cases, engaging the military as a source of women's safety (Abou Habib & Abdel Khalik, 2021), as though women's lives and bodies can be 'protected' and securitized in the same manner as states.

Indeed, despite the (feminist) civil society foundations of UNSCR 1325 (Anderlini, 2018; Otto, 2010; UN Women, 2015), the WPS agenda continues to be perceived, like other Security Council resolutions, as primarily state-centric and a reflection of “dominant normative discourses and mentalities” of conflict, security, and war (Kaya, 2020, p. 6), with a narrow understanding of security. Kaya also notes that “the net effect is that WPS’s selective approach and its underpinnings in militarized security negatively affect local civil society organizations by making them re-frame their existing work on women’s rights to fit with the international security agenda” (2020, p. 7), which has resulted in the WPS agenda narrowing opportunities for feminist space in several instances (Basu et al., 2020). This is also seen in the use of the agenda within counter-terrorism discourses to engage women in countering violent extremism, oftentimes against their own family members (Ní Aoláin, 2015).

Straying from the promotion of women’s full-fledged participation, the agenda has been used to lean into gendered assumptions about women’s presumed lack of agency in conflict and their “vulnerability.” As such, much of the focus of the agenda has turned to the protection of women and their so-called “special needs” (Chinkin, 2022), often read as chronic victimhood (oftentimes linked to sexual violence). The UN Global Study on WPS even noted that within the Security Council, there has been the assumption that the agenda is conflated solely with addressing protection from CRSV (UN Women, 2015), which is fortified by Global Indicators on WPS that focus on documenting the prevalence of sexual violence in conflict and post-conflict situations⁴ and the annual Secretary-General’s report on CRSV.⁵ This intense focus on CRSV is also divorced from feminist understandings of and activism against such violence, instead, by focusing on securitization, producing a “fetishization” of sexual violence that obstructs the roots causes of such violence (Meger, 2016).

Lastly, despite more than 20 years of activism and engagement around WPS, the agenda continues to be marginalized within the work of the Security Council and has not been properly mainstreamed into the Council’s overall workings. Research indicates that “discussions of women, or WPS matters, are relegated to specific topics of discussion—especially discussions on protection—or, more often, not discussed at all” (Jones, 2019). This includes, “an informal norm of relegating conversations about women, or gender, to the biannual formal sessions dedicated

to WPS in April and October” (Jones, 2019). However, the Security Council is not necessary for the legitimization of civil society’s WPS work because, “women’s organizations around the world have already been ‘doing 1325’ and governments are now catching up” (Swaine, 2009, p. 426).

Therefore, it is clear that there is a disconnect between what was initially envisioned with the passage of UNSCR 1325 and the WPS agenda, and what has come to fruition for activists and organizations whose work challenges the United Nations’ (and Member States’) narrow conceptions of peace and security. With discussion of WPS at the margins of the international sphere, how is it perceived and enacted in the MENA region?

Conflict, Women, and Gender Inequality: The Women, Peace, and Security Agenda in the MENA Region

For more than a decade, the MENA region has experienced exceptionally significant and increasing conflict, occupation, displacement, and insecurity, in addition to one of the longest military occupations on record. Pre-existing inequalities further compound the status of women and girls in this context. Indices and surveys examining the region provide a framework for understanding the current bleak status of women and girls in the context of peace and security. According to the WPS Index,⁶ out of 170 countries ranked on 11 indicators across three dimensions, nine MENA countries are in the bottom 20 (GIWPS & PRIO, 2021). According to the World Economic Forum’s (WEF) Gender Gap Index, the MENA region has the second-largest gender gap that will take 115 years to close (WEF, 2022), and the Arab Human Development Report notes that women in the region achieve only 85.5 per cent of men’s human development gains—almost 10 percentage points less than the world average (Abdellatif et al., 2019).

As for the WPS agenda, by 2022, 10 states in the region had drafted National Action Plans (NAPs) on WPS⁷ and the League of Arab States has a Regional Action Plan. Indicators related to women’s formal engagement in peacemaking and peacebuilding in the region tell a continued story of marginalization. The UN and other donors have worked to ensure that women in the region are engaged as experts and advisors in contexts such as Libya, Sudan, and Yemen, however, this still places them on the periphery of engagement rather than in a seat at the table. Since 2000, when UNSCR 1325 was adopted, only 32 signed peace agreements in the MENA region (out of 42) have provisions concerning “women,” “girls,” and/or “gender.” While relevant, the reference to

these terms does not guarantee that the specific needs of women and girls have been mainstreamed into such documents or that women had a formal role in the agreements.⁸ At the local level, women serve as non-formal or “inside mediators,” working to mediate conflicts within families, tribes, and local communities during and after conflict but continue to be locked out of Track I peace processes⁹ (Parry, 2022).

Despite some progress, the WPS agenda is still overwhelmingly seen as a gender issue across the MENA region rather than a tool that can address broad peace and security concerns. An 18-year review of the implementation of the WPS agenda in the MENA region concluded that it “has been uneven, at worst limited” (Parke et al., 2019). A lack of political will, a lack of understanding of, and a lack of adequate funding for the WPS agenda further contribute to its uneven implementation and, while women and gender are addressed throughout the agenda, it does not aim to challenge “the existing status quo of political power structures in the region” (Richter-Devroe, 2019, p. 261), which aligns with the agenda’s overall critique.

Regional civil society has benefited somewhat from the WPS agenda’s language and framework. However, it has also suffered the consequences of the framework’s rigidity vis-à-vis the international community and donor driven agendas, whereby many have had to reframe their work on women’s rights to fit the so-called international security agenda (Kaya, 2020). This approach, which avoids addressing the underlying causes of violence and conflict, means that inequalities will persist. Additionally, the agenda is believed to have “neutralized” women’s rights activism, serving as a “less contentious space” for women to work in because it fits within the securitization narrative for states and donors (Parke et al., 2019). Richter-Devroe (2019) has similarly argued that peacebuilding initiatives in Palestine also serve as a means to “discipline women’s political activism in the region within the limits of the liberal WPS agenda,” whereby certain forms of activism and political engagement are labeled as either “desirable and normative” or as “deviant” (p. 253).

Given these valid critiques about the agenda and the regional context, the next section presents some of the ideas and analysis from Asma Khalifa, Randa Siniora, and Rasha Jarhum about their engagement with the Security Council discussing issues pertaining to WPS in the MENA region, and their respective interventions.

Engagement with the Security Council: Issues Impacting the MENA Region

Some scholars have labeled engagement with the Security Council on the topic of WPS as a “pragmatic attempt” by activists and civil society to address necessary issues that impact women and girls during conflict (True & Davies, 2019). This is echoed by the interviewees who made clear that they view the WPS agenda as a “tool” or “mechanism” for advocacy, as noted by Asma, one among many, to address the situation of women and girls in conflict. Randa explains:

As a Palestinian human rights defender and activist for the past 35 years, I tell you that there are other stronger mechanisms than 1325...We have other options. I mean, if, for example, under common article one of the fourth Geneva Convention, there’s a lot of stronger tools to respect and ensure respect if the countries, the State Parties to the conventions, really want to push it forward.

Likewise, Rasha also drew upon other international frameworks: “I think CEDAW, though, is more important than the WPS agenda...Because CEDAW has an obligation; in terms of states, the WPS gives states a way out. It’s not obligatory.” This observation echoes what is now the common practice of aligning the WPS agenda more thoroughly with CEDAW, via General Recommendation no. 30 on women in conflict prevention, conflict, and post-conflict situations. This can “lead to more coherent gender policies in conflict and displacement,” and a “more holistic and feminist approach” (Kaya & Bond, 2019, p. 18).

While the activists have no illusions that engaging the Security Council is a panacea, they do acknowledge it as an opportunity to “directly speak to power,” as Asma explains. Acknowledging the Security Council as a site of a particular type of power serves as an important opportunity for activist voices and approaches to be amplified through the presentation of on-the-ground “truths” (True & Davies, 2019, p. 4–5). For example, Randa’s intervention to the Council in 2018 began with such an approach, where she discussed three women whose lives have been upended due to the Israeli occupation to provide “actual humanitarian stories of the disproportionate impact of the occupation on the lives of Palestinian women and girls.” She continues, “to me it was an opportunity; it made our voices heard.”

Engagement with the Security Council is seen as necessary but limiting. As mentioned earlier, there are only specific weeks during the year where debates on WPS and on CRSV are heard; however, other entry points exist, such as Arria-formula meetings and country-specific

meetings. Randa's intervention occurred during the debate on WPS; but having an ally Member State on the Council creates additional opportunities because a quarterly mechanism exists to address the situation in Israel and Palestine. This serves as a "special opportunity for Palestinian women to bring in the agenda of women, peace and security all the time...because we are speaking about the disproportionate impact of the occupation of Palestinian women."

Rasha's first intervention with the Security Council in 2018 on the situation in Yemen (and not specifically on WPS) was also an opportunity to amplify Yemeni voices. Her statement was written in consultation with 500 people: "I was asking them, what are the priorities? What do you want to people to hear?" While the experience was profound for her, the impact of this engagement was also substantial, because a resolution on Yemen (UNSCR 2451) that was subsequently released "had stronger language in terms of inclusion of women" and also recommended the creation of a peacekeeping mission, presaging the Stockholm Agreement,¹⁰ due to her intervention.

Asma's appearance in front of the Security Council was at the request of Ireland, which was working to include more perspectives from civil society, particularly female voices. Asma believes that this engagement resulted in the United Nations Support Mission in Libya (UNSMIL) adjusting its mission (the session also included a vote on UNSMIL's mandate) to provide special provisions for the protection of human rights defenders.

While these are positive outcomes, in some cases, the intervention can be seen as performative, with the outcome already decided. Asma finds that political will is often lacking and that stakeholders do not take decisions and "no one follows up with anything that you have said so it feels quite a lot like a performance...There's always this niggling feeling that it's not taken seriously enough, and I know it's not because people don't believe in the causes or the things that you support. But it's because the machine is so ginormous and moves so slowly, and it's so political."

The activists interviewed each have engaged in one or more of these platforms and suggest that they should be expanded to allow for greater and more frequent participation. While the debates on WPS and CRSV are important, an important critique is that they silo women's voices in a venue that is already heavily patriarchal and marginalizing. Asma argues that WPS needs to be

mainstreamed throughout debates and interventions of the Security Council and not as special sessions:

What is the point of doing a special session that's isolated from political and military discussions that happen in the UN? Whilst the mandate tells you specifically that women should be integrated...power structures or patriarchal power structures find a way to claim to give women's rights while at the same time putting them in their own rooms where they aren't in touch with anything that has to do with real power decision-making...You can't just isolate them and then say, well, that's your contribution.

Additionally, Randa argues that civil society is also marginalized in these discussions. "When we speak about the engagement with civil society organizations universally, I think it's not sufficient that the Security Council gives the opportunity only for one statement every year and for one key speaker when there are all these conflicts all around the world that are impacting women disproportionately compared with other persons." She believes that there "should be an ongoing process of lobbying and advocacy work with diplomatic missions in order to push states to bring in the recommendations on their behalf."

One of the greatest critiques of the WPS agenda is the lack of accountability, via the Security Council and other UN mechanisms, for the agenda's implementation. Accountability can mean different things in the context of WPS. One form of accountability is ensuring that Member States work to implement the agenda rather than passing the obligation along to civil society and non-governmental organizations. The popularity of WPS in the international arena means that states are adopting the agenda and drafting NAPs without a commitment to implement. As Randa notes, "what we find problematic is that while we develop the second generation of the Women, Peace and Security agenda, the heavy load is on NGOs [nongovernmental organizations] like us to implement the action plan, rather than the official institutions, which have a legal obligation."

A second issue relates to the agenda not having a formal accountability or reporting mechanism, like the CEDAW Committee, despite article 25 of the UN Charter which outlines that Member States agree to accept and carry out the decisions of the Security Council. As a result, many states see engagement with the agenda and development of a NAP as voluntary, meaning that "it doesn't create a lot of influence" in Randa's opinion.

Another critique of the WPS agenda, and the Security Council more broadly, is that conflict is being managed rather than resolved and even the Council's commitment to the agenda is called into question. "Sometimes even the UN itself is not doing its proper job according to 1325," observes Asma. As such, even after more than 20 years, many women's lives in the region are at a standstill, as Randa explains: "In committing to WPS, the Security Council recognized the importance of women's meaningful participation and that without women, there can be no peace. The lives of Palestinian women are evidence that these commitments have not been met." Furthermore, Randa explains, "It is not resulting in measures to stop conflicts or to try to stop militarization, which is our ultimate goal. I mean, our engagement with the peace and security agenda is really because we believe that women have a different perspective to peace building and peacemaking, and because we want to stop wars and conflicts and it's not enough to have a special representative to the Secretary-General who reports on it."

Despite the call for women's participation, which is a key pillar of the WPS agenda, women's engagement in the MENA region has been marginalized, including within UN mechanisms. For example, Rasha, in her statement to the Arria-formula, explained that Yemeni women have been consistently told that "including women will upset the negotiating parties and disrupt a fragile peace process," and that "ending war comes before fulfilling our rights. We hear these excuses not only from our own government, but also from the UN and supportive Member States." Asma also informed the Council, in her prepared statement on the current situation and future of Libya, that women "are punished through exclusion for being non-violent actors in this conflict. There is a lack of political will to implement agreements and policies to integrate women meaningfully and properly across the various processes. Women are tokenized, their work and visions for peace in Libya not taken seriously." This was further illustrated when she noted that international actors also resisted engaging Libyan women using culture as an excuse, yet, "some of the [Libyan] men that they'd invited to come to the table actually brought female advisors with them." In each context, overt and covert exclusion legitimized the overall exclusion of women in spaces important for addressing aspects of conflict.

Recommendations for Improving Engagement

By way of conclusion, the activists suggested possible entry points for improving engagement with the Security Council. While not a means to solve all the issues of engagement on WPS and the agenda itself, these recommendations aim to provide greater opportunities for constructively influencing the Council and the broader international community. Simultaneously, these recommendations aim to cultivate a stronger voice for civil society and women's rights activism from the MENA region.

A Stronger Role for Civil Society to Consult with the United Nations

All three activists stressed that civil society needs a stronger consultative role within United Nations organs, like the Security Council. Acknowledging the value of their inputs as peacemakers and peacebuilders, Asma recommended that "civil society should take a straight up role in consulting with the UN," with greater opportunities to speak freely, because "there is an element of, if you do criticize them, you might lose a position." Randa called for the NGOWG to "push forward greater engagement of civil society organizations because they have the holistic picture of what's happening worldwide and how women are being impacted;" this should include a greater cross-section of conflict affected countries, especially from the MENA region.

Greater Opportunities for Engagement in Other United Nations' Mechanisms

For some of the activists, formal Security Council engagement should not be the only opportunity to discuss WPS issues and the impact of conflict on the lives of women and girls in their respective contexts. For example, Rasha, having participated in an Arria-formula, specifically recommended that,

We need to have the power to hold the Arria-formula, not a state, but civil society. Civil society can call for an Arria-formula meeting and bring the UN Security Council to their space...They can partner with one state who can support, like in terms of logistics, [if you] don't have access to the...Security Council. But at least give the leadership to civil society to organize a space for the topic they want to discuss.

In a similar vein, Randa suggested "that there should be a one-minute opportunity for oral statements, which we did last year under CSW [Commission on the Status of Women]...Or written interventions that could be used as tools" to guide Member States or diplomatic missions in their advocacy and/or policy work on WPS.

Greater Opportunities for Developing Networks and Collaboration Amongst Civil Society and Other International Actors

Cultivating strong networks and collaboration is seen as a necessity given that many activists are working on their specific contexts, sometimes in silos, and often are not engaged with other activists and civil society organizations doing similar work on WPS. Randa described this possible collaboration as occurring through “advocacy trips from the different countries under conflict for women to directly speak to the diplomatic missions, not only during the week on the WPS agenda but annually, all through the year.” Such engagement would strengthen transnational and regional activist links, while also increasing opportunities for direct engagement with the United Nations and other influential international actors.

As a final reflection, there is no doubt that women’s rights activists and women’s civil society are responsible for propagating and institutionalizing norms related to the WPS agenda, whether abiding by the agenda’s framework or developing their own localized interventions. This has been the case even before the agenda was formalized by the United Nations with the adoption of UNSCR 1325. However, what these interviews additionally highlight is that marginalization continues to occur. Speaking directly to power (as Asma earlier noted) and being able to engage with and sometimes challenge that power, should be a necessary component of the WPS agenda if we are to honor its (feminist) civil society foundations. As a part of this process, it is equally important and necessary that an entity, such as the Security Council, respects the knowledge and perspective that these activists bring to the table, while also recognizing their power, as partners, to ensure the realization of a peace and security that goes beyond pragmatism.

Notes

¹ To review all the resolutions, see: <http://www.peacewomen.org/why-WPS/solutions/resolutions>

² For links to the different debates, see: https://www.peacewomen.org/security-council/security_council_debates

³ Named after Ambassador Diego Arria of Venezuela, Arria-formula meetings are informal meetings “convened at the initiative of a member or members of the Security Council in order to hear the views of individuals, organizations or institutions on matters within the competence of the Security Council.” For

more information, see: <https://www.securitycouncilreport.org/un-security-council-working-methods/arria-formula-meetings.php>

⁴ A list of the indicators can be found at: <https://www.peacewomen.org/security-council/WPS-indicators-and-monitoring>

⁵ All reports can be found at: <https://www.un.org/sexualviolenceinconflict/digital-library/reports/sg-reports/>

⁶ The Index measures three basic dimensions of well-being: Inclusion (economic, social, political); Justice (formal laws and informal discrimination); and Security (at the family, community, and societal levels).

⁷ As of this writing, these include Djibouti, Iraq, Jordan, Lebanon, Morocco, Palestine, Sudan, Tunisia, the United Arab Emirates, and Yemen.

⁸ For more details, see the PA-X Women, Girls, and Gender (PA-X Gender) Database at the University of Edinburgh: <https://www.peaceagreements.org/wsearch>

⁹ Track 1 diplomacy entails formal negotiations utilizing representatives or diplomats. In contrast, Track 2 diplomacy refers to conflict resolution efforts by non-governmental conflict resolution practitioners or experts. Track 1.5 is a hybrid that involves official and non-official actors working together.

¹⁰ The Stockholm Agreement (2018) is an accord between the parties to the conflict in Yemen, resulting in, among other things, a cease-fire in the port city of Hodeidah.

References

- Abdellatif, A., Pagliani, P., & Hsu, E. (2019). *Arab Human Development Report research paper: Leaving no one behind: Towards inclusive citizenship in Arab countries*. UNDP RBAS. https://arab-hdr.org/wp-content/uploads/2020/12/UNDP_Citizenship_and_SDGs_report_web.pdf
- Abou Habib, L., & Abdel Khalik, Z. (2021). *Policy paper: Women, Peace and Security in the Arab region*. Arab States Civil Society Organizations and Feminists Network. <https://arabstates.unwomen.org/sites/default/files/Field%20Office%20Arab%20States/Attachments/2021/07/WPS-Policy%20Paper-EN.pdf>
- Anderlini, S.N. (2018). Civil society's leadership in adopting 1325 resolution. In S.E. Davies & J. True (Eds.), *The Oxford handbook of Women, Peace and Security* (pp. 38-52). Oxford University Press. <https://doi.org/10.1093/oxfordhb/9780190638276.001.0001>
- Basu, S., Kirby, P., & Shepherd, L.J. (2020). Women, Peace and Security: A critical cartography. In S. Basu, P. Kirby & L.J. Shepherd (Eds.), *New directions in Women, Peace and Security* (pp. 1-25). Bristol University Press.
- Chinkin, C. (2022). *Women, Peace and Security and international law*. Cambridge University Press. <https://doi.org/10.1017/9781108692076>
- cook, s. (2016). The "woman-in-conflict" at the UN Security Council: A subject of practice. *International Affairs*, 92(2), 353–372. <https://doi.org/10.1111/1468-2346.12553>
- cook, s., & Allen, L. (2020). Holding feminist space. In S. Basu, P. Kirby & L.J. Shepherd (Eds.), *New directions in Women, Peace and Security* (pp. 123-130). Bristol University Press.
- Georgetown Institute for Women, Peace and Security (GIWPS) & the Peace Research Institute Oslo (PRIO) (2021). *Women, Peace, and Security Index 2021/22: Tracking sustainable peace through inclusion, justice, and security for women*. <https://giwps.georgetown.edu/wp-content/uploads/2021/11/WPS-Index-2021.pdf>
- Jarhum, R. (2021). *Statement by Ms. Rasha Jarhum Security Council Open Arria-formula meeting*. Women's Solidarity Network and Peace Track Initiative. <https://www.womenpeacesecurity.org/unsc-arria-womens-participation-statement-rasha-jarhum-march-2021/>
- Jones, K. (2019). How often does the UN Security Council use a gender lens? Not often enough. *E-International Relations*. <https://www.e-ir.info/2019/11/06/how-often-does-the-un-security-council-use-a-gender-lens-not-often-enough/>
- Kaya, Z. (2020). *Feminist peace and security in the Middle East and North Africa*. Oxfam. <https://oxfamilibrary.openrepository.com/bitstream/handle/10546/621055/dp-feminist-peace-security-mena-210920-en.pdf>
- Kaya, Z., & Bond, H. (2019). *Women, peace and security and displacement in the Middle East*. LSE Middle East Centre. <https://core.ac.uk/download/pdf/222840698.pdf>
- Khalifa, A. (2021). *Statement from Ms. Khalifa to the UN Security Council on the current situation and future of Libya*. Khalifa Ihler Institute. <https://www.khalifaihler.org/newsb/2021/9/10/statement-from-ms-khalifa-to-the-un-security-council-on-the-current-situation-and-future-of-libya>
- McMillan, C., Tonelli, A., & Mader, K. (2020). "Do our voices matter?" *An analysis of women civil society representatives' meaningful participation at the UN Security Council*. NGO Working Group on Women, Peace and Security & Oxfam. https://www.womenpeacesecurity.org/wp-content/uploads/Do-Our-Voices-Matter-Oxfam_NGOWG_Full-Report.pdf
- Meger, S. (2016). The fetishization of sexual violence in international security. *International Studies Quarterly*, 60(1), 149–159. <https://doi.org/10.1093/isq/sqw003>
- NGO Working Group on Women, Peace and Security (NGOWG) (2020). *About*. <https://www.womenpeacesecurity.org/about/>
- Ní Aoláin, F. (2015). Jihad, counter-terrorism, and mothers. *Just Security*. <https://www.justsecurity.org/20407/jihad-counter-terrorism-mothers/>

- Otto, D. (2010). Power and danger: Feminist engagement with international law through the UN Security Council. *Australian Feminist Law Journal*, 32(1), 97–121.
<https://doi.org/10.1080/13200968.2010.10854439>
- Otto, D. (2019). Contesting feminism's institutional doubles: troubling the Security Council's Women, Peace and Security agenda. In J. Halley, P. Kotiswaran, R. Rebouché, & H. Shamir (Eds.), *Governance feminism: Notes from the field* (pp. 200-229). University of Minnesota Press. <http://doi.org/10.5749/j.ctvdjrpfs.12>
- Parke, A., Farr, V., & Alodaat, L. (2019). *Eighteen years on: Assessing the implementation of the UNSCR 1325 Women, Peace and Security agenda in the Arab States region*. UN Women.
<https://arabstates.unwomen.org/en/digital-library/publications/2019/01/eighteen-years>
- Parry, J. (2022). *Women's participation in local mediation: Lessons from Iraq, Libya, Syria and Yemen*. UN Women. <https://arabstates.unwomen.org/en/digital-library/publications/2022/06/womens-participation-in-local-mediation-lessons-from-iraq-libya-syria-and-yemen>
- Richter-Devroe, S. (2019). UN Security Council resolution 1325: A framework for women's peace activism in the Middle East? In S. Akbarzadeh (Ed.), *Routledge handbook of international relations in the Middle East* (pp. 252-264). Routledge. <https://doi.org/10.4324/9781315229591>
- Shepherd, L.J. (2008). Power and authority in the production of United Nations Security Council Resolution 1325. *International Studies Quarterly*, 52(2), 383–404. <http://doi.org/10.1111/j.1468-2478.2008.00506.x>
- Siniora, R. (2018). *Statement by Ms. Randa Siniora UN Security Council open debate on Women, Peace and Security*. NGO Working Group on Women, Peace and Security.
<https://www.womenpeacesecurity.org/resource/statement-unsc-wps-open-debate-october-2018/#:~:text=In%20committing%20to%20Women%2C%20Peace,commitments%20have%20not%20been%20met>
- Swaine, A. (2009). Assessing the potential of National Action Plans to advance implementation of United Nations Security Council resolution 1325. *Yearbook of International Humanitarian Law*, 12, 403–433.
<http://doi.org/10.1017/S1389135909000142>
- True, J., & Davies, S.E. (2019). Women, peace, and security: A transformative agenda? In J. True & S.E. Davies (Eds.), *The Oxford handbook of Women, Peace, and Security* (pp. 3-14). Oxford University Press.
- UN General Assembly (1979). *Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women*. 18 December. A/RES/34/180
- UN Security Council (2000). *Resolution 1325*. 31 October. S/RES/1325.
- UN Security Council (2013). *Resolution 2122*. 18 October. S/RES/2122.
- UN Security Council (2018). *Resolution 2242*. 13 October. S/RES/2242.
- UN Security Council (2019). *Resolution 2467*. 23 April. S/RES/2467.
- UN Security Council (2019). *Resolution 2493*. 29 October. S/RES/2493.
- UN Women (2015). *Preventing conflict, transforming justice, securing the peace: A global study on the implementation of United Nations Security Council resolution 1325*. <https://unwomen.de/wp-content/uploads/2022/03/UNW-GLOBAL-STUDY-1325-2015.pdf>
- The University of Edinburgh (n.d.). *PA-X Women, Girls, and Gender (PA-X Gender) Database*.
<https://www.peaceagreements.org/wsearch>
- World Economic Forum (WEF) (2022). *Global Gender Gap Report 2022*.
https://www3.weforum.org/docs/WEF_GGGR_2022.pdf